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The Role of Public Interest Litigation and Other Alternatives
Andrew J. Roman*
I.

MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CANADIAN AND UNITED STATES
CONSUMER ADVOCACY LEGAL SYSTEMS

The type of consumer advocacy found in any jurisdiction is a function

of a complex set of factors unique to that jurisdiction. Even the Canadian experience varies significantly from province to province. However,
to the extent that one can generalize at the national level, including the
civil law system in the Province of Quebec, this article will attempt to
outline the key differences in consumer litigation between Canada and
the United States.
The first and, perhaps, the most important factor, is what economists refer to as economies of scale. Since most consumer litigation is
financed by consumer groups, the relative size and wealth of these groups
is important when comparing consumer litigation between the two
countries.
The United States has a population of approximately two hundred
and seventy million persons, and Canada approximately ten percent of
that. If one-half of one percent of the United States' population contributed financially to a consumer group, that would be approximately 1.3
million people. In Canada, that would translate to only 130,000 people.
Assume equal per capita contributions. The United States is capable of
supporting a magazine of the quality of Consumers' Reports, with its
expensive tests of consumer durables, (e.g. cars), and Consumers' Union,
which can maintain a substantial law office in Washington. By comparison, the only Canadian consumer group of any size, the Consumer's Association of Canada (CAC), has a magazine printed on"cheap paper, and
a testing program which can barely afford to pay for testing household
cleansers, bicycles, and inexpensive toys. The Canadian federal government has rescued CAC twice from bankruptcy due to losses incurred by
the magazine. The CAC used to have one or two full-time lawyers at its
head office in Ottawa, supported entirely by government grants. However, because of financial problems, the CAC legal program has now
been discontinued. Economies of scale in Canada prevent consumer
groups from funding any significant litigation in the courts because they
simply do not have the money.
So far, equal per capita contributions by supporters has been assumed. This, however, is unlikely to be the case. It is possible to make
* Partner, Miller Thomson, Toronto, Canada.
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an educated guess that another important difference is that Americans
show greater support for "causes" than do Canadians. This may be because Canadians have less discretionary income after taxes, and weaker
tax incentives to contribute to charities. For whatever reason, the normal rule of thumb, (i.e., the one-tenth principle), does not apply to contributions to consumers' groups, whether for the self-interested purpose
of obtaining a magazine or for the unselfish purpose of making a financial
donation. The same may be said of the environmental movement; environmental groups with any stature or recognition in Canada can be
counted on the fingers of one hand. Moreover, these groups have budgets and memberships considerably less than one-tenth of their U.S.
counterparts.
Court costs are another significant difference in the Canadian and
American systems. Under the two-way costs rule, found in every province in Canada, the loser of a case must pay a substantial portion (perhaps two-thirds) of the winner's costs. Also, failure of either party to
accept what is found at trial to have been a reasonable settlement offer
may result in an order to pay the full legal costs that the other side incurred after the offer. The purpose of such rules is to force settlement
and to avoid adjudication. This can work particular hardships on plaintiffs where the central issue is one of principle and not merely damages.
In a nutshell, the effect of these differences is that there is almost no
public interest consumer litigation in Canadian courts. For example,
there has only been one consumer class action suit of any significance.'
Naken took a decade to work through the court system before reaching
2
the Supreme Court, where the case was finally dismissed. The grounds
for dismissal were that the rules of practice were too cryptic to permit
class actions and that these rules could only be amended by legislation.
As we shall see, such legislation has been a long time in coming.
Similarly, the environmental area has seen no significant actions for
damages or injunctions. What modest litigation which has occurred in
the last few years has had the federal government as the defendant for
refusing to require that two large dam construction projects go through
the federal environmental assessment review process. As a response to
the plaintiffs' success, proposed new federal legislation solves the government's problem by making subjection to environmental assessment even
more discretionary in the future than it has been in the past.
II.

WHERE HAS THE ACTION BEEN?

Consumers' groups have not been entirely invisible. The main focus
of public interest litigation has been before a broad range of administrative boards, commissions, and tribunals which are active both federally
General Motors of Canada v. Naken, 1 S.C.R. 72 (S.C.C. 1983).
The case was struck out after the expiry of the limitation period, so the four plaintiffs who
brought the class action were precluded from starting an ordinary action in their own names.
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and provincially. Despite some deregulation in recent years, the history
of consumer advocacy in Canada has been a history of intervention in
public utility rate hearings and appearances before other non-judicial
tribunals. There are two principal reasons for this.
First, such tribunals do not use the two-way costs rule, therefore,
the consumer group is unlikely to be saddled with an enormous bill for
the other side's costs. Second, several of the major tribunals3 require the
utility or other proponent to pay the intervenor group's costs for lawyers
and expert witness fees as long as they were reasonably incurred. The
rationale for this is that if the customers of the utility have to pay the
utility's lawyers to argue that the rates should be increased, it is in the
interest of these same customers to pay consumer advocates to present
the opposite side of the case.
It is not very difficult for a consumer advocate to have his fees paid
by the utility. For example, in a recent case at the Public Interest Advocacy Centre, an attorney, on behalf of his client, the National Anti-Poverty Organization, asked the CRTC to order Bell Canada to repay the
proceeds of an excessive interim rate increase. The company was ordered to repay $250 million to consumers in the form of a credit for
approximately two months of free telephone service.4 The regulator also
ordered Bell Canada to pay roughly $200,000 in costs for the testimony
of two expert witnesses and the lawyer's legal services. While not every
consumer case is that successful, it is unlikely in Canada that a result
involving that large a benefit for consumers could have been obtained in
the courts, especially at zero cost to the client and zero risk that the
client would be ordered to pay Bell Canada's costs.
In Ontario, the provincial government was concerned that intervenors' costs in public interest cases could only be awarded after the judgment. Public interest groups often cannot afford to finance the case
pending the final costs award, nor can they take the risk that such an
award might not be made.5 As a result, Ontario enacted the Intervenor
Funding Project Act, 6 which permits certain tribunals to award funding
to intervenors in advance of the hearing, on a modest scale, with the
potential that this will be supplemented by a full costs award at the end.
The other provinces are carefully watching this legislation.
Recently, under this legislation, the Ontario Environmental Assessment Board awarded a record $21.5 million to groups and individuals
challenging Ontario's electricity monopoly, Ontario Hydro's, plan for ex3 Eg., the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, (CRTC), most
provincial public utilities boards, and the Ontario Environmental Assesment Board.
4 The company appealed and the case went all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada, where
Bell Canada lost.
5 Such an award is only made if the tribunal considers the group to have participated responsibly - an easy test - and "contributed to a better understanding of the issues" - a rather subjective
and unpredictable criterion.
6 Intervenor Funding Project Act, Ont. Stat. ch 71. (1988).
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panding its electrical generating capacity over the next twenty-five
years. 7 To put this in perspective, the plan is to spend approximately $85
billion to build a number of nuclear and hydraulic generating stations.
The final costs to be awarded to the twenty-eight groups, and one individual, chosen by the Board to receive financial assistance, is expected to
be well in excess of the $21.5 million dollars, perhaps more than double
that amount, for the two year hearing.
III.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The almost complete absence of public interest litigation in the
courts could change, at least in Ontario, if two new pieces of legislation
are enacted in the summer of 1992, as planned. As other provinces often
follow the examples set by Ontario, these developments will probably
spread across the country over the next several years.
The first and most important of these new laws is the class proceedings legislation introduced by the former Liberal Provincial government,
and reintroduced' by the present Democratic government. Although for
the last decade Quebec has had a class action law substantially similar to
that of the Federal rule in the United States, Ontario's Bill is considerably more liberal than either the U.S. or the Quebec model. Under the
new law, certification requirements in Ontario will be minimal, and the
two-way costs rule will be mitigated in the discretion of the court in appropriate cases. As well, the lodestar and multiplier technique used by
the U.S. courts 9 for assessing attorney fees will be adopted, so as to permit a form of court-regulated contingent fee.' °
Ontario has a pending bill which will adopt Quebec's special legal
for class actions." This will pay for disbursements for such
fund
aid
things as notice and expert witness fees. Notice provisions in the Ontario
bill have been designed to minimize the representative plaintiffs' costs so
as to avoid the type of problem found in the United States case of Eisen v.
Carlisle and Jacquelin et al. 2
A second major reform is the law of standing. Although the
3
Supreme Court of Canada, in its famous quartet of cases, has greatly
7 Decision of the Funding Panel, December 14, 1990.
8 Bill 28 and 29, first reading December 17, 1990.
9 See Lindy Bros. Builders Inc. v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161 (3d Cir. 1973); See also, Re: Fine PaperAntitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
10 Contingent fees are currently forbidden in Ontario. Ontario's licensing body for lawyers is
now considering the introduction of contingent fees more generally. These have already been approved in principle, subject to working out the details of the necessary legislative amendments.

11 Bill 213, 34th Legislature, Ontario, 39 Elizabeth II, 1990. The Class Proceedings Bill is
relatively short, but contains too many interesting provisions to be discussed in this paper in any
depth, therefore, the reader should peruse it at his or her leisure.
12 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin et aL, 417 U.S. 156 (1975).
13 Thorson v. Attorney General, 43 D.L.R.3d 1 (1974); Nova Scotia Boardof Censors v. McNeill,
55 D.L.R.3d 632 (1975); Ministerof Justice of Canadav. Borowski, 130 D.L.R.3d 588 (1981); Minis-
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liberalized standing in the areas of constitutional and administrative law,
with the result that virtually anyone can seek a declaration that a law or
administrative practice or expenditure is ultra vires or unconstitutional,
this is not of great assistance to consumer or environmental groups. The
new law of standing, which will soon be introduced to the Ontario Legislature, will explicitly abolish the traditional rule that a plaintiff, in order
to have standing, must have a proprietary, pecuniary, or other personal
interest greater than and different from that of the general public. The
new law will likely state that no person who raises a valid cause of action
shall be denied standing, unless permitting the litigation to proceed to
trial would unduly prejudice the interests of persons (other than the defendant) who are non-parties to the litigation. This law amounts virtually to open standing. Similarly, there will be amendments to the costs
rules paralleling those for class actions and, also, perhaps a similar fund
to cover disbursements in public interest cases.
Intervention, or what is in the United States commonly called amicus curiae status, is granted fairly liberally in Canada at the appellate
level. However, the would-be intervenor is not permitted to introduce
evidence. If too many intervenors were allowed to participate in a case
and to admit evidence, we would no longer have bipolar adjudication
but, rather, something more closely resembling a legislative process. The
purpose and scope of standing to intervene is a matter which should be
resolved soon.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Public interest advocacy in Canada has never been and probably
never will be as enjoyed by plaintiffs or as feared by defendants in Canada as it is in the United States. The proposed new laws discussed above
will help a great deal in advancing public interest litigation in Canada.
However, these access-enhancing devices are essentially adjectival and
is
not substantive law. The type of class action law in any jurisdiction
4
very much a function of the substantive law of that jurisdiction.
For example, Canadian antitrust law is much weaker than its U.S.
counterpart. As Canadians cannot bring treble damages suits, they have
no powerful financial incentive to sue. Moreover, under the Competition
Act a government official, known as the Director of Investigation and6
Research, 5 has a monopoly on access to the Competition Tribunal.'
Therefore, even a very liberal class action law is unlikely to facilitate
significant private antitrust litigation.
terof Finance (Canada) v. Finlay, 33 D.L.R.4th 321 (1986); Gourietv. Union of Post Office Workers,
[1978] A.C. 435.
14 Benjamin Duval, Jr., Book Review of the OLRC Report on Class Actions, 3 WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF AccEss TO JUSTIcE 411, 431 (1983).
15 Competition Act, R.S.C. ch. C-34 (1985).
16 See, eg., Id. § 79.
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The Director's monopoly in enforcing the Competition Act before
the Competition Tribunal illustrates well the profound differences between the Canadian and U.S. legal systems. The U.S. system encourages
self-help and private enforcement of law to a much greater extent than
does Canada. A civil suit in the United States is a much more accepted
method of resolving conflicts than it is in Canada. Canada has delegated
much of the tasks of resolving conflicts to bureaucrats and regulators.
Canada is still very much a constitutional monarchy with a high degree
of institutional and cultural deference towards authority. The United
States, on the other hand, is a republic with a traditional suspicion of
governmental power, which is institutionalized through a system of constitutional checks and balances. Americans see the judiciary as a branch
of government equal in importance to, and competing for power with,
the other two branches. In Canada, the courts are viewed as subordinate
to Parliament, which is constitutionally supreme (except to the limited
extent that Parliament has declared otherwise in our CharterRights). 7
Because of these differences in constitutional history and attitude, public
interest litigation in Canada has far more limited opportunities than exist
in the United States. Nevertheless, Canadian funding of intervenors
before administrative tribunals and the new class proceedings and standing laws are steps in the right direction.

17

Constitution Act, 1982, pt. 1.

